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RISKY BUSINESS: MEDICARE'S VULNERABILI1Y TO
SELECTION GAMES ,OF MANAGED CARE PROVIDERS
Charles Tiefert
Heather Akehurst-Krausett
I. INTRODUCTION

As Congress accelerates the Medicare population's movement
into managed care, Medicare's vulnerability to selection games by
managed care providers looms as a serious problem for both the
Treasury and the over-sixty-five population. This Article explores the
significance and nature of that vulnerability to selection garnes,
before· turning to what the government should do to counteract
them.
Medicare matters; Medicare managed care matters in particular} Medicare's costs expanded to $199 billion in fiscal year 1996 to
about twelve percent of the federal budget. 2 These costs will grow to
$248 billion in 2001 and to $347 billion in 2006; only then will the
steep phase of the increase begin when the Medicare demands of
the "baby boom" generation start in 2010. 3
Congress began responding to these cost increases in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA),4 using incentives to push the
Medicare population' toward managed care and other methods of
cost control.s Currently, Medicare represents the last large population pool still predominantly receiving fee-for-service coverage and
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I.

2.
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5.

B.A., 1974, Columbia University; J.D., 1977, Harvard Law School. Solicitor and
Deputy General Counsel for the House of Representatives, 1984-1995; Profe!r
sor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
B.S. in Nursing, 1995, University of Maryland; Student, University of Baltimore
School of Law. The Authors would like to thank Emily R. Greenberg and her
skilled staff for their library-computer assistance.
See generally Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996).
See Steve Langdon, With Campaign Dust Settling, Medicare Chances Brighter, 55
CoNG. Q. WKLY. REp. 175, 179 (1997).
See id.; Sf'R- also CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., ECONOMIC AND BuDGET OUTLOOK:
FISCAL YEARS 1998-2009 (1999).
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4701, III Stat. 251, 489
(1997) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13%u-2 to 13%u-v).
SP.e Charles Tiefer, Treatment for Medicare's Budget: QJ.tick operation or Long-1'erm
Care?, 16 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 27, 34-35 (1996).
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moving like a glacier, slowly but on a vast scale, into managed care. 6
Accordingly, legal observers and courts7 have begun focusing on the
problems faced by Medicare and the elderly as a result of this
change. These problems include inadequate grievances and appeal
procedures,9 patient dumping,1O and underutilization,l1 among other
things. 12
Part II of this Article concerns Medicare's vulnerability to managed care provider selection games. 13 Managed care providers have
every incentive to enroll healthier, less demanding beneficiaries and
leave the program's more problematic beneficiaries unserved. That
way lies profit. However, that way also leaves the federal government
with increased cost and difficulty in arranging care for residual,
problematic recipients. 14 It further leaves those problematic beneficiaries caught between the disincentives that Congress, and rising
health costs, will create for Medicare beneficiaries who fail to sign
onto managed care and the agility of managed care providers in
avoiding their enrollment. IS As a large part of the population comes
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

See id. Traditionally, Medicare beneficiaries received fee-for-service coverage,
simply going to the hospital or doctor of their choice, and sending the bill to
the government. See Langdon, supra note 2, at 179. In 1999, only 15% of
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care plans. See Mary Agnes
Carey, New Strategy, Old Disputes, 57 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 18, 19 (1999). By contrast, 85% of Americans with employer-based health insurance receive their
medical care through managed care, with the plan defining the limits of the
care they receive and their choice of hospital and doctor. See id.
See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998). In a recent class action suit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
rulings regarding beneficiary requests for services must be made within a reasonable time, and that such rulings must be written in type large enough for
the beneficiaries to read. See id.
See Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate Enrollee Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 TENN. L. REv. 359,
362-71 (1998).
See Jess Alderman, Medicaid & Medicare: HCFA Must Monitor HMOs to Ensure A~
peal Rights for Medicare Beneficiaries, 26 lL. MED. & ETHICS 253, 254 (1998).
See George P. Smith, II, Patient Dumping: Implications for the Elderly, 6 ELDER LJ.
165, 166 (1998).
Mary DuBois Krohn, Comment, The False Claims Act and Managed Care: Blowing
the Whistle on Underutilization, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 443, 444 (1997-98).
See Karen Visocan, Recent Changes in Medicare Managed Care: A Step Backwards for
Consumers?, 6 ELDER LJ. 31, 32 (1998) (discussing the consumer protection
problems associated with managed care).
See discussion infra Part II.
See Smith, supra note 10, at 166-74.
See id.

1999]

Medicare's Vulnerability to Selection Games

321

to depend on the availability of Medicare-managed care providers
for their health care, and sometimes their lives, the potential for
burden-evading games by providers could strike justifiable fear in a
sizeable percentage of Americans.
Part III of this Article concerns what the government should
do. Primarily, the government should institute and improve risk adjustment programs. 16 These programs would adjust the payments to
managed care providers so that they would only receive payment
commensurate with the risks they take on.17 The creation ,of this direct relationship between risk and payment requires addressing the
argument that managed care providers function best in a free marketplace with less bureaucratic supervision, rather than with risk adjustment. Others argue the protections of the False Claims Act lS can
be made to apply, thereby permitting the government to pursue
wrongful managed care provider efforts to evade the risk adjustment system based in fraud. '9 This proposal involves considering the
argument that any such evasion falls short of fraud since it does not
involve false billing for nonexistent beneficiaries or for services not
rendered. 20
II. THE PROBLEM OF MANAGED CARE PROVIDER RISKSELECTION

A. Medicare's Evolution
As the largest public program for financing individual health
care, Medicare has remained politically popular. Since the inception
of Medicare provisions in 1965, as set forth under Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act, this non-appropriated 21 entitlement program has
steadily increased in COSt. 22 The growing elderly population and
ever-increasing cost of health care account for this dramatic increase. 23 Preservation of Medicare's financial integrity relies on a
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

See discussion infra Part III.
See Leslie M. Greenwald et aI., Risk Adjustment for the Medicare Program: Lessons
Learned from Research and Demonstrations, 35 INQUIRY 193 (Summer 1998).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1996).
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND Poucy, 226-40 (2d ed.
1998).
See id. at 226-27. Program costs jumped from $7.1 million in 1970 to $70.7 million in 1985 and to $156.5 billion in 1995, accounting for greater than 10% of
the entire federal operating budget. See id. at 110.
See Judith Feder & Marilyn Moon, Managed Care for the Elderly: A Threat or a
Promise? (Managed Care and Older People: Issues and Experiences.), GENERATIONS,
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two-fold process: cost reduction and revenue increase. 24 A shift in
Medicare administration from a fee-for-service (FFS) model to one
of managed care is one viable option for obtaining cost
reductions. 25
In the BBA, the 105th Congress supported a shift to Medicare
managed care with the inclusion of provisions for the Health Care
Finance Administration's (HCFA)26 "Medicare Choice."27 However,
with the benefits of managed care comes the participation of Managed Care Organizations (MCOs); their incentives, of course, lie in
the direction of profit maximization. 28
The Medicare program's new Part "C," known as Medicare Choice,29 offers beneficiaries more options in the allocation of
federal financing to their health care entitlement. 3o Part C provides
for a variety of private health plan choices for beneficiaries through
MCOs categorized as Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Provider-sponsored Organizations (PSOs), and Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) , in addition to the continued traditional FFS option. 31 The new regulations set forth a multitude of provisions
June 22, 1998, at 4 available in 1998 WL 16365280.
See Tiefer, supra note 5, at 29 ("The powerful support in the population for
preserving Medicare as much as possible will forge a balance with the political
opposition to the painful substantive steps of cost reduction and revenue increase necessary for such preservation.").
25. See id.
26. The Health Care Finance Administration oversees the Medicare. program administration under the Department of Health and Human Services, which in
turn is overseen by Congress. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 21, at Ill.
27. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
28. See Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care ~ra, 16
HEALTH AFF. 34, 35 (Jan/Feb 1997). '
29. See 42 C.F.R. § 422 (1998).
30. See HAVIGHURST. supra note 21, at 112. For a comprehensive outline of the current Medicare Choice provisions, see Joe Baker, Medicare HMOs and the Medicare Choice Program, 85 (Practicing Law Institute New York Practice Handbook
series No. F-18, 1998).
31. See Sandra Christensen, Medicare Choice Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, 17 HEALTH AFF, 224, 224 (1998). PPOs are provider networks that impose lower cost-sharing requirements on an enrollee who uses network providers as opposed to non-network providers. See id. PSOs are organizations of "affiliated health care providers that provide a substantial portion of services
covered by a plan." /d. Generally, the affiliated health care,providers "have a
m~jority financial interest in the PSO." ld. MSA~ offer enrollees a medical savings plan consisting of any excess of Medicare's capitation payment over their
plan's annual premium, from which the benet1ciary may make non-taxable
withdrawals for the purpose of paying out-of-pocket medical expenses. See id.
24.
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extending from MCO providership to beneficiary participation and
the role of the government in each area of the program.32

B. The Risk Selection ''Pitfall'' in Managed Care
Studies on the existence and prevalence of risk selection have
occurred since the inception of the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), the preceptor to the growing managed care way of
life. 33 Statistics indicate that thirty percent of all health care spending is attributable to one percent of the total population. 34 Though
payor-sponsored data suggests that Medicare beneficiaries enrolled
in managed care plans are satisfied with their health care coverage,35 the presence of risk selection, also called '~nrollment" or '~e
lection bias," is strongly supported in the medicalliterature. 36 Advocates for the elderly have also recognized selection bias as a major
factor facing the Medicare population in obtaining adequate health
care coverage and access to care. 37
As a result of this research, both the medical and legal communities have acknowledged that selection bias is a significant issue in
predicting cost and health care outcomes for managed care recipients, not only in regard to Medicare beneficiaries but also to health
care consumers as a whole. 38 The HCFA's inadequate consideration
of the possibility that provider plans may manage a disproportionate
number of older, more ill beneficiaries is also accountable for poor
cost management issues. 39

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

39.

at 224-25.
See 42 C.ER. § 422 (1998).
See generaUy, Fred J. Hellinger, Selection Bias in Health Maintenance Organizations:
Analysis of Recent Evidence, 9 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 55, 58-60 (1987) (discussing the rise in HMO enrollment and the research on HMOs that demonstrates a high rate of'selection bias).
See Thomas L. Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does It Take to Fix the Health Cam
System?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1825, 1832 (1998) (book review).
See Steven Brostoff, PoUs Show Public is Satisfied with Managed Cam, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 25, 1995, at 16.
See Robert O. Morgan et aI., The Medicare-HMO Revolving Dour-The Healthy Go
In and the Sick Go Out, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 169, 169-75 (1997); see also
Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Cam and Medicam Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'y & L. 595, 605-07 (1997); Katherine Swartz, Risk Selection and Medicam Choice: Bewam, INQUIRY, Summer 1998, at 101, 101-03.
See Feder & Moon, supra note 23, at 4.
See, e.g., Oberlander, supra note 36, at 604-07 (explaining how HMO cost controls affect the quality of care received by HMO beneficiaries and that selection bias is one such cost control).
See generaUy 144 CONGo REc. S12, 274-76 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement of
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Risk selection occurs in two ways, both of which have a significant effect on the payment scheme of Medicare. The first type of
risk selection occurs when beneficiaries "shop around" for the managed care plan that best meets their medical needs. 40 For example,
beneficiaries may seek optimal managed care coverage for their
health care needs, then disenroll back into the FFS sector seeking
more services when their health deteriorates, and re-enroll into
managed care once their increased care needs subside. 41 Relatively
healthy recipients are more willing to change health care providers
or plans than ill individuals who have developed a therapeutic relationship with their providers. 42 Long-term safeguards against this
type of selective enrollment, by way of "lock-in" provisions, are discussed later in this Article. 43
The second type of selection bias-the one of most concern
here-occurs due to actions by MCOs.44 This concept involves
targeting the healthy elderly population for enrollment, who are
less likely to utilize expensive health care services. 45 Capitated prospective payment46 to the MCOs for healthy beneficiaries using
fewer services logically results in more profit. There are several
means by which MCOs have taken advantage of the ability to practice selective enrollment. It is believed that selection bias by beneficiaries encourages these efforts by managed care to enroll low-risk
beneficiaries. 47

40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

Senator Frist) (supporting the managed care industry's position that delayed
planning of a payment scheme aimed at reducing risk selection, complicated
and lengthy regulations, and inappropriate "punishment" legislation bear
some responsibility for cost concerns and other issues facing the monumental
Medicare transition).
See HAVIGHURST, supra note 21, at 264; see also Morgan, supra note 36, at 170;
Swartz, supra note 36, at 101.
See Morgan, supra note 36, at 174 (concluding that ill individuals tend to move
out of managed care).
See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (citing literature concluding that "all
'health plans which restrict an enrollee's choice of provider (i.e., HMOs and
exclusive provider organizations) attract relatively healthy individuals' H).
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607.
See Swartz, supra note 36, at 101. This strategy appears to be working quite well
for HMOs. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (noting that beneficiaries
who enroll in HMOs tend to be significantly healthier than those in FFS and
are therefore less likely to need medical care).
See Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 193-209 (describing the evolution of
capitated and prospective payment in Medicare).
See id. at 194.
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One major culprit in the area of selective plan enrollment is
that of marketing strategies implemented in transitioning ~edicare
to the managed care arena. 48 Managed care marketing to Medicare
recipients is direct, unlike insurer marketing for corporate or business health care contracts for employees.49 The latter allows insurers
to target employers with low-risk employees, while using strategies to
seek Medicare enrollees that are in the low-risk category of excessive health care expenditure. 5o While marketing by managed care
plans is specifically addressed by the HCFA regulations,51 there are
no minimum marketing requirements that assure dissemination of
program information to known high-risk geographic communities,
nor are there requirements regarding the advertisement of specific
types of programs offered by the managed care plans. 52 It is feasible
that plans would only offer programs focusing on well populations,
even if the plans were voluntarily presented in high-risk geographic
areas. High-risk geographic areas include primarily urban neighborhoods in which there is likely to be a higher per capita rate of recipients with chronic, costly health care needs. 53 The HCFA's provisions in the Medicare Choice rule are currently insufficient for
protecting Medicare beneficiaries and the program from the costly
effects of selective enrollment.
III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO RISK SELECTION
A. Selection Bias by Medicare Beneficiaries
Reverse selection bias-bias practices by the enrollee-will re-main an issue under the BBA and the Medicare Choice provisions
that allow .recipients nearly unlimited disenrollment rights for the
first several years after the rule's enactmentY This benefit, however,
See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (chronicling the competition among
health insurance plans to sign up the best risk enrollees and their marketing
strategies to target the best risk population).
49. See itt. at 608.
50. See· id. (discussing strategies such as face-to-face meetings and direct telephone
marketing practices which enable the proVider to investigate a potential enrollee's health status and either encourage or discourage enrollment based on
the risk factor analysis).
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (1998) (requiring that all marketing materials be approved by HCFA prior to distribution in providership communities and that
beneficiaries in the same geographic area each receive the same information
regarding plan offerings and benefits).
52. See id.
53. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
54. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.62, 422.66 (1998) (stating that through 2001, the number
48.
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becomes significantly limited when the same proVlSlons mandate a
restriction by a "lock-in" period of enrollment that is to begin in
the year 2002.55 Recipients tend to enroll in managed care plans
while their health needs are few, but disenroll when they escalate. 56
They dis enroll in favor of plans offering additional Medicare coverage, or the FFS sector, and return to lesser-providing MCOs when
their acute health issues subside and their needs decline. 57
The future Medicare Choice limitations prevent enrollees from
"plan jumping" in search of better coverage by locking them into
one plan for a longer period of time and restricting the opportunity
for disenrollment and re-enrollment into other plan options. 58
These long-term limitations allow for better prospective cost analyses and a more effective use of the risk adjustment model in determining a payment scheme for Medicare managed care as a whole. 59
B. Selection Bias by Managed Care Providers

Aside from reverse risk selection, MCO selection bias practices
raise significant concerns for the financial welfare of the Medicare
program and, more importantly, the medical welfare of the nation's
growing elderly population. Just as "lock-in" provisions are anticipated to reduce risk selection by beneficiaries, there will also be a
favorable reduction of MCO-biased selection activities. 60 However,
Medicare's exposure to these practices will continue due to several
other mechanisms employed by MCOs that are not adequately addressed by the current regulations. 61
For example, as previously noted, selective marketing is a major

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

of elections or changes that a Medicare Choice individual may make is not
limited); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 89; Christensen, supra note 31, at
229.
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.62, 422.66 (1998) (explaining that after 2002, individuals
may change plans or disenroll, but that either decision may be made only
once during the first six months of the year).
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See Morgan, supra note 36, at 174.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 229 (discussing the effect that the open enrollment procedures will have in making selective marketing by the MCOs
more difficult). But see id. (predicting also that selection bias on behalf of enrollees will continue to occur even after lock-in due to plan options, particularly MSAs).
See id. (noting that the new open-enrollment procedures will tend to reduce
favorable selection among new enrollees).
See id.
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method of managed care provider selection. 62 One suggested solution is the inclusion of centralized marketing provisions. 63 Such regulations would restrict providers from directly communicating with
prospective enrollees, make favorable risk selection more difficult,
standardize program information to all beneficiaries regardless of
geographic location, and provide more reasonable protection
against abusive and fraudulent marketing practices. 64 Development
of standard policies to which benefit information packages must
conform65 and setting standards by which benefits can be measured
are other options to ensure the unbiased marketing of the managed
care product. 66 The concept of standardized benefits packages is not
new nor is it exclusively beneficial to the new Medicare system. 67
Th~ inability of potential managed care recipients to fully comprehend these confusing options also raises concerns. 68 It is frequently those recipients with the greatest health care needs that are
unable to make appropriate health plan choices in light of this confusion. 69 There is an absence of clear provisions offering personal
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.

67.

68.
69.

See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
See Oberlander,. supra note 36, at 620.
See id. at 620-21.·A standardized plan comparison of benefits, premiums, and
cost-sharing-similar to that used by the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program-is suggested. See id. Professor Oberlander also calls for automatic
inclusion of physician and financial plan incentive information in a centralized marketing package as a means of further reducing selection bias that occurs when assertive, educated enrollees make other health plan choices after
requesing this additional information from the prospective provider. See id.
Current regulations require only that this information be distributed upon request. See id. at 621.
See 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (1998). HCFA currently requires only that managed care
providers provide enrollees with basic benefits information. See id. No standardization of plan information is specified. See id.
See Swartz, supra note 36, at 102. Implementing such standards will prevent
"tailoring" . of benefits packages to healthier individuals, make recipient~ better able to compare costs of various plans, and prevent false advertising by the
insurer. See id.
See id. Medigap policies were required' by Congress to conform to 10 uniform
benefit packages, as mandated by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990. See id. This legislative change was made t9 address similar issues of consumer confusion and risk-selection that arise between Medicare beneficiaries
and HMOs. See id.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228; Swartz, supra note 36, at 102.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228 (observing that enrollees will face a "bewildering array" of options and that "[m]aking appropriate health plan
chokes unassisted may be beyond the ability of some enrollees, especially
those who are impaired by disability, age, illness, poverty, or lack of educa-
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assistance to needy beneficiaries in making these complicated
choices. 70 Implementation of standardized benefits packages is one
way to assure dissemination of necessary information. 7 ! An additional regulation can provide for impartial adjutant services that
must remain independent from managed care responsibilities in the
enrollment process. This service should allow for one-on-one communication with an appointed assistant whose scope of responsibility would be limited to providing sufficient and timely managed
plan information regarding benefits, premiums, and cost sharing requirements, in comparison to those for the FFS sector. Additional
provisions for more specific ombudsperson services would also benefit the program as a whole, assisting in establishing trust within the
vulnerable elderly population.
Health care provider incentives and influences are a third consideration in the selection bias dilemma.72 Due to the fact that
Medicare beneficiaries depend on their past and present physicians
for guidance in decision making, there has always been a danger
that managed care providers will use incentives to influence physicians to give advice that is more in the interest of the MCa than
the patient. The HCFA already has fairly comprehensive regulations
with regard to limitations on how and to what extent managed care
administrators can compensate physicians for keeping medical expenditures of enrollees down. 73 The medical community has turned
to the managed care industry for a response to the criticisms of
poor enrollee care and management, claiming that a lack of fiduciary ethics within the industry is responsible for these concerns. 74

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

tion H).
See id.; see also Swartz, supra note 36, at 101. Focus groups participating in
HCFA infonnation package testing reported great confusion. See id. An anticipated percentage of elderly with memory or mental impainnent, and vision
or hearing difficulties account for a significant senior population in need of
assistance with decision-making. See id.
See Swartz, supra note 36, at 102.
See Gray, supra note 28, at 45; see also Oberlander, supra note 36, at 600, 603.
See 42 C.F.R. § 422.208 (1998) (defining requirements and limitations of physician incentive plans).
Noting the absence of an ethical orientation by organizational health care
providers, the American Medical Association (AMA) supports the development of ethical standards within the industry and an increase in physician
control within the organizations. See Gray, supra note 28, at 37-38 (encouraging the establishment of non-profit managed care groups is another suggestion).
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Beyond the physician-client and physician-MCO influence question are the concerns of indirect selection bias attributed to managed care affiliate decisions at the corporate level. While Provider
Service Organization75 and MCO provisions exist, the same regulations fail to address the significant influence on selective enrollment
that managed care groups have when choosing their affiliating hospitals, physicians, and specialty service contract providers. 76 Undoubtedly, networking of providers and centers occurs, typically oriented to an overall healthy population. For example, community
hospitals and centers catering to the healthier middle and upper
class are more likely to be sought as network providers over urban
teaching facilities that provide a large percentage of indigent care,
which is often associated with consumers requiring increased health
services at a substantially greater cost per capita. 77 Health care consumers with multiple or chronic requirements tend to be associated
with larger, multi-service-providing institutions and will likely opt for
FFS care when they experience difficulty in finding an MCO who
contracts with their current, multiple-specialty providers. 78
This system of manipulation has been linked to the need for
increased and ongoing quality monitoring.19 However, hypothesizing
a legislative solution is difficult. The Medicare Choice rule addresses monitoring of managed care client data,80 but determining
what measures and data would be most useful in formulating solutions requires more time. 81 One possible solution is to initiate regulations providing for specific minimum service standards that assure
availability of any specialty care programs required by health care
consumers, either through direct or indirect provider provisions .
. Examples include mental health services and more traditional medical program needs, such as diabetic care and rehabilitation services.
Mandating such services, in addition to existing programs targeted
at preventative health care and the well population, standardizes all
75. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.350 (1998) (defining Provider Service Organization as a private or public entity that is organized by a group of affiliated providers).
76. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103.
77. Compare Bryan A. Lang, Understanding and Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution
Methods in Modern Medicine Conflicts, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 406, 406 (1998), with Editorial, Indigent Care Rigid Law Burdens Urban County Hospitals, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998, at 14A.
78. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607.
79. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103.
80. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.257 (1998).
81. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103.
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managed care program benefits. This standardization would result
in a reduction not only in MCO"selection bias, but also reverse selection bias by high-risk enrollees whose population would be more
evenly dispersed among provider groups within a geographic area.
Successful implementation of this type of program includes the utilization of the centralized marketing model previously discussed. 82
With these minimum program and marketing provisions in place,
the area risk adjustment can be reasonably addressed as the next
logical aid in reducing selection bias by managed care providers.
Perhaps most important, Medicare must adjust what it pays
managed care providers. Until now, Medicare has paid provider organizations on a basis that ignores the different risks and needs of a
diverse pool of beneficiaries. The principle of adjusted average per
capita cost (AAPCC),83 a means by which Medicare costs for fee-forservice recipients were to be reduced by five percent upon their
transition into a managed care plan, is included in the BBA as part
of a "risk adjustment" plan. 84 Implementation of a new risk adjustment factor 5 should more adequately account for the selection bias
by managed care providers that had previously resulted in a six to
eight percent increase in cost, instead of the anticipated five percent reduction for recipients enrolled in Medicare managed care
plans. 86 Medicare financial examiners have long addressed risk adjustment as a primary solution to risk selection87 and reliance on it
remains unfettered. 88 Risk adjustment counterbalances risks associated with health care provisions in high-risk geographic areas by
82.
83.

84.
85.

86.

87.
88.

See supra notes 6:ui7 and accompanying text.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225. AAPCC is a method by which Medicare's capitation rates were set at 95% of expected program costs under the
FFS management and was figured for similar beneficiaries residing in the
same county. See id.
See ilL
See id.; Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 194. The current risk adjusters used
in reimburse-ment rate calculations are age, sex, institutional status, concurrent Medicaid enrollment, and employment status with regard to employment-based insurance. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225. The BBA will implement a "health status" adjustment factor by the year 2000. See id.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 230 n.3 (citing a Congressional Budget Office memorandumand other sources that demonstrate an increased payment
rate for HMOs over the FFS sector); see also Greenwald et aI., supra note 17,
at 194-95 (finding the HMO overpayment range to be anywhere from 5-20%,
resulting from selection bias).
See Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 193.
See id. at 202·07 (discussing HCFA's long-term interest in risk adjustment data
and implimentation).
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providing a mechanism for an alternative reimbursement system to
corporate care providers who agree to serve such communities, beyond the capitated rates set through the AAPCC formula. 89 Historically, risk adjustment-based payment planning has resulted in variability in reimbursement rates that managed care providers
determined too risky in allowing them to predict profits on an annual basis, thereby discouraging plan offerings in these high-risk
communities. 90 These decreased offerings ~in high-risk communities
are due in part to the weaknesses of current demographic risk adjusters in explaining individual beneficiary variations in cost. 91
The BBA lacks specific provisions for the immediate determination and implementation of a health status adjuster. 92 Currently, the
addition of a non-specified health status adjuster by the BBA is
slated for the year 2000,93 bringing with it the expectation that reimbursement for enrollee health care in excess of the capitated rates
will reduce the avoidance of the medically needy by MCa plans,
thereby further minimizing selection bias practices. 94 The benefit
sought by legislators of Medicare reform is the reduction of capitation rates 'in relation to FFS per capita costs. 95
Minimum regulations, centralization of marketing practices,
standardization of benefits, and specialty service provisions are four
possible initiatives for tackling the prevalence of selection bias. Constraints on providership incentives and implementation of independent enrollee assistance services are equally important. Moreover,
the internal development of fiduciary ethical standards by the managed care industry is a prerequisite to successful management of the
selection bias' issue. 96
Only after the appropriate management of these accountable
practices is dealt with can implementation of risk adjustments be initiated with hopes at minimizing whatever selection bias remains. AI89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225-26 (discussing the AAPCC and the effect
of the BBA-proposed blended rates and floors on the provision of care in geographic areas at high risk for variable payment); see also Greenwald et aI.,
supra note 17, at 193-95 (discussing the risk adjustment formula).
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 226; see also Greenwald et aI., supra note 17,
at 194.
See supra note 85.
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 229-30.
See 42 C.F.R. § 422.256(d) (1998) (providing only that a health adjuster will be
added by HCFA, effective January 1, 2000).
See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228.
See id. at 227.
See generally Gray, supra note 28, at 38-41.
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though risk adjustment processes have been substantially investigated,97 closer monitoring of the effects of risk selection strategies
on managed care practices and costs is still required. There are
measures worth implementing, modeled on the extant scattered
provisions, directed toward providing sanctions for violations in care
provision and prohibiting specific practices. 98
Managed care providers may well oppose or criticize the institution of risk adjustment reform by the HCFA. The industry and some
members of Congress have consistently criticized efforts by the
HCFA at directing managed care as involving too much bureaucratic supervision99 instead of the preferred solution of trusting the
market. 100
A major concern of the managed care business surrounds the
time frame in which health factors are incorporated into the adjustment formula. Managed care providers doubt the HCFA's ability to
collect sufficient and timely diagnostic client data to enable them to
mandate reasonable risk adjustment. 101 From the beneficiaries' perspective, such data may not be collected in time to prevent their exclusion by specific plans that have met the already reduced minimum enrollment requirements lO2 established by the regulations. 103
The legislative record over the past fifteen years and the
HCFA's ensuing regulation support pressing ahead with full-scale
risk adjustment. Fifteen years ago, the HCFA engaged in little pricing supervision of providers, and health care cost inflation drove
Medicare costs up at incredibly high rates. In a legislative and regulatory revolution, Congress enacted and HCFA regulate~ a system of
prospective pricing, first for hospital care and then for physician

97. See grmeraUy Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 195-97.
See 42 C.F.R. § 422.110 (1998) (stating explicitly that discrimination against
beneficiaries is prohibited, but providing no sanctions).
99. See 144 CoNG. REc., S12275 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement of Senator
Frist).
100. See Mary Agnes Carey, Managed Care Overhaul Shows New Signs of Life, 57 CoNG.
Q WKLY. REp. 129, 134 Gan. 16, 1999).
101. See Christensen, supra note' 31, at 230; see also Greenwald et a!., supra note 17,
at 202-03 (outlining the duties and requirements placed on the Department
of Health and Human Services).
102. The BBA effectively eliminates the "fifty-fifty" rule that previously required
50% enrollment of commercially insured recipients (non-Medicaid/Medicare)
by managed care plans, and reduces the minimum enrollment requirements
for PSOs. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225.
103. See 42 C.F.R. § 422 (1998).

98.
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care. 104 The Medicare "market," which is distorted by the government "footing" of the bill and the general lack of protection of ordinary market economics for health care consumers, would not
have worked without that regulatory revolution. !Os Initially, risk adjustment, like prospective pricing, will be instituted on a rush basis
with less-than-ideal data lO6 and with industry complaints of insufficient time to adjust. However, like prospective pricing, time will polish its rough edges and make it seem, in retrospect, an inevitable
necessity.

C. Applying the False Claims Act to Managed Care Risk Selection
The previous suggestions may be insufficient because of powerful incentives for managed care providers to improve their profit
position by selecting lower-risk Medicare beneficiaries. Even a risk
adjustment system depends on a degree of good faith cooperation
from providers. 107 Managed care providers could furnish inaccurate
information to the HCFA, reporting that they are assuming more
risk than they actually are, just as health service providers have submitted false information that they provide more valuable services
than they actually do-what is commonly known as "upcoding." On
the other hand, providers may furnish truthful information, yet seek
preferred risks, in ways not caught by the relatively simple risk adjustment data sets.108 Given the prevalence of fraud in federallyreimbursed health care,l09 not to expect such abuses is somewhat
optimistic, if not naive.
In federal health care programs, the emerging legal check on
such problems has become the False Claims Act,11O among other
fraud and abuse statutes. 1I1 The False Claims Act allows the Depart104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.

Tiefer, supra note 1, at 450.
id.
Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 207.
generally PAMELA H. BuCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL. CML. AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1996).
See generally MALCOLM K SPARROW. LICENSE TO STEAL: WHY FRAUD PLAGUES
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYsTEM (1996).
See id.
See generally David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Firepower is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127 (1995).
For discussions of the anti-kickback laws, see generally James F. Blumstein, The
Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health
Care SPeakeasy, 22 AM. lL. & MED. 205 (1996); see also Francis H. Hearn, Jr.,
Curing the Health Care Industry: Government Response to Medicare Fraud and Abuse,
5 l CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 175 (1989).
See
See
See
See
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ment of Justice to sue those who make false claims, including Medicare care providers,1I2 for such abuses as fraudulent billing, misstatements of utilization,l13 and false claims about the quality of health
care rendered. 1l4 Moreover, under the Act's qui tam provisions, private individuals-"whistleblowers"-can file suit on behalf of the
Treasury for recovery, collecting a portion of the proceeds of ·the
judgment or settlement as a reward. ll5
To assure that the False Claims Act applies to the risk adjustment context, HCFA should require managed care providers to forward certifications in order to receive payment. The certifications
can simply concern the accuracy of the risk adjustment data, or
could more broadly oblige the MCO to certify that it has disclosed
any pattern or practice which would operate to distort the statistical
validity of the risk adjustment system. In effect, such certifications
shift the burden from the government to the managed care provider of surfacing provider game-playing in the risk adjustment
process.
Managed care providers could raise several objections to such a
policing mechanism. First, they could complain that it adds to the
burdens of bureaucratic supervision, reporting, and red tape, the
excessive penalties and intrusiveness of certification requirements
and the False Claims Act remedy. This argument comes down to
weighing the dangers in the risk adjustment process against the burdens on the managed care providers.
Second, the managed care providers could argue that, absent
gross and crude fraud, the government suffers no concrete harm.
Obviously, fraud cheats the Medicare program, but managed care
providers can point out that they may face investigation, litigation,
and liability for risk selection approaches far from gross and crude.
112. See Gregory T. Jaeger & Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Fractious Fraud Fights, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at 832; see also Christopher A. Myers & Michael L. Martinez, Looking Closely at Doctors' Bills, Legal Times, Mar. 4, 1996, at 826-27.
113. See Carolyn J. Paschke, The Qui Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The
Statute in Current FQT7TI, Its History and Its Unique Position to Influence the Health
Care Industry, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 163, 169-70, 177-78, 180 (1994-95).
114. See David C. Hsia, Application of Qui Tam to the Quality of Health Care, 14 J. LE·
GAL MED. 301, 302 (1993); see also Michael M. Mustokoff et aI., The Government's Use of the Civil False Claims Act to EnJarce Standards of Quality of Care: Ingenuity ar the Heavy Hand of the BOO-Pound Carilla, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 137, 141
(1997).
115. See Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the
Government and the Relatar Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1357,
1383 n.159 (1998).
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Suppose, for example, the marketing methods of managed care
providers "inadvertently" have some "subtle" selection effect, not
consciously intended, and not showing up on HCFA's risk adjustment factor set. This would not involve any out-and-out intentional
falsification of data provided to the government, but moreover, the
provider could argue that the government suffers no real harm. After all, the managed care provider furnishes the services it claims to
provide and the government pays the fee for such services.
Similar arguments have occurred elsewhere regarding the application of the False Claims Act, and Congress has not imposed any
higher state-of-mind requirements or proof burdens. 116 The issue is
whether the statute should apply in what managed care providers
term the absence of "actual harm," where the provider actually provides the services it claims, and without actually engaging in false
billing, finds ways to get around Medicare's inevitably simplified and
limited risk adjustment system.
The courts have begun addressing situations where the provider does render the services billed for, but evades some aspect of
the government's regu!atory requirements. Notably, in United States
ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,117 Columbia
Healthcare had billed for Medicare services actually provided. I IS It
merely violated Stark laws regarding improper incentives to physicians who referred its patients. 1I9 Columbia argued that the violation of such regulations did not amount to a false claim where it actually furnished the services. 120 The district court agreed with
Columbia, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. 121 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that if the government would
not pay for Stark non-compliant services, then falsely certifying compliance with the Stark requirements, was a false claim. 122
More generally, there are several ways to conceptualize the appropriateness of imposing certification requirements and False
Claims Act penalties to back up the risk adjustment system. The
purpose of the Medicare program, including the risk adjustment
system, is not merely to buy a set amount of services. Rather, the
116. See United States ex reL Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125
F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).
117. 125 F.3d 899 (1997).
118. See id. at 901.
119. See id. at 900 n.1.
120. See id. at 900, 902.
121. See id. at 902.
122. See id.
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program aims to provide for the health care needs of the Medicare
beneficiary population, which requires effective statistical distribution of the coverage risks. A provider who gives actual services, but
plays games with the distribution of coverage risks, deprives the government of what it seeks to buy.123 The nation will increasingly pay
out a sizeable portion of its federal government funds to purchase
Medicare managed care coverage for its aged. This country cannot
accept not getting what it is paying for.
IV. CONCLUSION
The enormous scale of Medicare costs in coming years makes
the movement of the Medicare beneficiary population into managed care one of the largest public law developments of our time. 124
The authority enacted by Congress for the Health Care Finance Administration falls short in significant ways that allow participating
managed care providers the. means for manipulating the system for
financial gain, without providing the necessary protections for program recipients. 125 Implementation of risk adjustment principles,
though necessary, does not suffice. No single adjustment factor can
treat the infirmities of the health care system. 126 Whether shoring it
up by vigorous implementation of fraud sanctions might help
enough as to the risk selection problem is an open question.
Medicare has evolved rapidly. Given the public reluctance to
radically change Medicare's economics by cutting benefits or by raising dedicated taxes, Medicare can use every sensible reform that
will make its funds go as far as possible. The reform discussed in
this article would be a start.

123. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see Charles Tiefer & Michael Blumenfeld, Qui Tam Recovery Without ''Actual Damages," 6 FALSE ClAIMS Acr & QUI
TAM Q REv., July 1996, at 23.
124. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part II.
126. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.

